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Abstract 
This paper studies the macroeconomic impact of economic freedom on foreign 
direct investments inflows in both global and regional panel analyses involving 156 
countries through the period of 1995-2016. Unlike to prior literature, it includes 
often neglected nations such as Fragile and Conflict-Affected states, Sub-Saharan, 
Oceanian, and Post-Soviet countries. The paper finds a positive impact of 
economic freedom on FDI under fixed-effects model in global case where a unit 
change in economic freedom scales FDI inflows up to 1.15 units. More specifically, 
all 9 regions also refer to positive and significant impact of economic freedom on 
FDI. The highest impact is recorded in European countries, whereas the lowest 
ones are documented in Fragile-Conflict affected states, Sub-Saharan zone, and 
Oceanian countries. 
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1. Introduction 
The latest version of economic growth model (Eduardo Borensztein, Jose De 
Gregorio, and Jong-Wha Lee, 1998) advocates that host countries can inherit from 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in many ways. First, it contributes to growth 
through capital accumulation by attracting money flows into the country. The 
second way is through training and development of local citizens in order to get 
them used to the new technology. Besides, FDI also increases the level of 
competition and improves resource allocation by enhancing domestic financial 
market and lowering the cost of acquiring new capital. It is therefore imperative 
and necessary for countries to pin down policies that favor and attract more 
investment in order to better the standard of living of their population. 
In fact, Kusi Hornberger, Joseph Battat, and Peter Kusek (2011) refers that 
FDI has increased globally not only in developed countries but also in least 
developed and transition economies. More specifically they state that their share 
in global FDI has scaled from 19% in 2000 up to 52% in 2010, hence it estimates 
that the volume of global FDI will attain to level of $3-4 trillion in 2014. Indeed FDI 
has increased due to recent amplifications in links between nations through 
internationalization process, as well as due to improvements in economic 
freedom of developed and emerging markets. Even a number of recent studies 
(Elizabeth Asiedu 2006; Kazeem Bello Ajide and Perekunah Bright Eregha 2014; 
Bosede Victoria Kudaisi 2014) find that most of Sub-Saharan countries have 
become more attractive in terms of FDI inflows, but its share in global FDI is less 
than 2% (Mory Fode Fofana 2014). On contrary, FDI of Arab countries has 
negatively affected by recent instabilities and conflicts, i.e. Arab Spring, arose in 
the Middle East. Indeed, to our knowledge, these countries are often marginalized 
and excluded from studies which emerge a gap in literature. 
In this study we attempt to fill this gap by including these fragile-conflict 
affected states as well as often neglected Post-Soviet countries in our sample to 
examine the impact of economic freedom on FDI. Beside the global analysis of 156 
countries through the period of 1995-2013, the study also gives a sight to the 
region-based interaction of FDI inflows with economic freedom level of nations. 
Our results reveal that a 1% increase in economic freedom triggers the global FDI 
up by 6%. Furthermore, the aftermath of region-based analysis indicates that a 
percentage change in economic freedom alters FDI inflows by 17% in Europe, 12% 
in Asia, 7% in Africa, and 8-9% in North and South America. Additionally the 
analysis of neglected regions also shows significant results where 1% increase in 
economic freedom boosts FDI inflows by 14% in Sub-Saharan Africa, 10% in Post-
Soviet countries, 5% in Fragile-Conflict affected states, and 4% in Oceania region. 
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2. Literature Review 
A sizable empirical literature exists on macroeconomic impact of economic 
freedom and its components on FDI. For instance, Rakesh Sambharya and Abdul 
Rasheed (2015) examine the macroeconomic effects of economic and political 
freedom on FDI inflows in 95 host countries in a panel data analysis through the 
periods of 1995-2000. Their results suggest before benefiting from FDI inflows, 
countries need to emphasize on a better economic management in terms sound 
monetary policy, fiscal burden, and banking and finance. Additionally they 
advocate that less government participation into an economy, strong property 
rights, low prevalence of informal markets, and less corruption are desirable for 
more FDI inflows. 
On the other hand, Dennis Pearson, Dong Nyonna, and Kil-Joong Kim (2012) 
investigate the impact of economic freedom and growth on FDI in state levels, 
indifferent to most studies that consider determinants of FDI inflows into United 
States as a country. They use a panel data analysis of 50 states through the period 
of 1984-2007 employing random-effects model. They find that both growth and 
economic freedom have significant positive impact on FDI in all states. However, 
the authors also explore that per capita income and unemployment rate cause 
negative impact on FDI. They address these relations to the fact that states with 
higher per capita income repel FDI inflows since higher income implies higher 
wages, and high unemployment rate is positively associated with crime ratio, thus 
discourages investors' interests. 
Likewise Mart Bengoa and Blanca Sanchez-Robles (2003) also examine the 
interplay between economic freedom, growth, and FDI inflows using a panel data 
analysis of sample of 18 Latin American countries from 1970-1999. They observe 
that economic freedom remains positive and significant both in fixed- (0.0043) 
and random-effects (0.0046) regression models deriving similar coefficient 
magnitudes which imply their robustness. On the other hand, the impact of 
growth on FDI appears significant only in fixed-effects model with magnitude of 
0.01. Eventually, they conclude that both economic freedom and growth in host 
countries generate benefits on FDI inflows only if there is a sufficient human 
capital accompanied by economic stability and liberalized markets. 
Furthermore, Asiedu (2006) studies the role of natural resources (export of 
oil, gold and others), government policy (human capital in terms of literacy rate, 
quality of infrastructure, and inflation rate), market size (income per capita), 
institutions (rate of corruption and rule of law) and political instability (number of 
coup, assignations and revolutions) on FDI in a panel data analysis of 22 African 
countries from 1984 to 2000. She employs Hausman test and finds that the 
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random-effects model generates biased estimators. Preferring the fixed-effects 
model she exhibits that a unit change in openness of economy alters FDI by 0.20 
units when policy variable is proxied with human capital (literacy rate), and by 
0.23 units when it is proxied with infrastructure investments (landline phone 
penetration) of the country. Here, she specifies that an increase in FDI does not 
always indicate amplification in economic growth, because she addresses an 
ambiguous empirical relation of these two in literature as some studies that 
stipulate augmentations of economic growth with certain conditions such as 
when the host country has higher quality education (Borensztein et al., 1998); 
optimal income level (Matthew Tyler Lund, 2010); or well-established financial 
markets and regulations (Maria Carkovic and Ross Levine, 2005). 
Besides, Fofana (2014) measures the influence of economic freedom 
components on FDI in 25 Western European and 26 Sub-Saharan countries 
through 2001-2009 where he discovers that the aggregate index of economic 
freedom is not a significant explanatory of FDI for African case, but European 
countries. He proxies economic freedom with three institutional variables such as 
"the size of the economy", "the size of the population", and "the legal system and 
rule of law"; and with three regulatory variables such as "size of government", 
"freedom of international trade", and "regulations of labor, credit, and business". 
As a results he observes that only "legal system and rule of law" variable appears 
significant in African sample, where it fails to be significant in European sample. 
More specifically, the author also discovers positive links between GDP and FDI, 
and Population and FDI; meanwhile he finds negative association of Natural 
Resources and FDI in fixed-effects model with cross-section dummy variables 
where he accounts 94% of variation in FDI. He addresses it to the current stage of 
this region which is in the development process. Besides he also admits that 
insufficient observation number is another restriction of his study which leads to 
insignificant results.  
Nonetheless, he finds plausible results for European sample where economic 
freedom, i.e. that is proxied by "size of government", "freedom of international 
trade", and "regulations of labor, credit, and business", appears statistically 
significant determinant of FDI. He also explores very similar results as African case 
with fixed-effects model that includes cross-section dummy variables. The only 
difference between cases appears as disappearance of significant impact of 
population on FDI in European sample. 
On the other hand, Rahim Quazi (2007) investigates the collision of economic 
independence on the flow of foreign investment in a panel data regression for 
seven major East Asian countries over 1995-2000 periods, employing both fixed- 
Y. Sovbetov & M. Moussa / JEFA Vol:1 No:1 (2017) 59-80 
 
Page | 63  
 
and random-effects models. Initially he examines the full sample where 70% of 
FDI is explained by its first lag, political instability, and market size variables in 
random-effects model. But both in random-effects and GLS models the economic 
freedom fails to be significant.  
However when he adds a dummy variable for China, a country in sample that 
requires a exceptional attention due to being magnet for FDI, both random-
effects and GLS models estimate significant but negative impact of economic 
freedom on FDI. Indeed this negative coefficient implies positive impact on FDI. 
Because he proxies the economic freedom variable with domestic investment 
climate that is constructed on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 indicates set of policies 
most favorable to economic freedom, and 5 represents policies with least 
conducive. The outcomes unveil that the dummy variable tends to be very 
significant with a magnitude of 3.07 in the fixed panel and 3.43 in the random 
panel. In addition all other explanatory variables (change in the volume of FDI 
inflows, political stability, market size and level of profit in investment) turn out to 
be significant except quality of infrastructure and human capital. He concludes 
that investment flows to China more than other countries in the sample because 
of the huge natural resources, its cheap labor cost, also the geographic proximity 
to Hong Kong and Taiwan, the recent forms in the economic sector are also other 
factors. 
Moreover when he considers taking the China out of the sample, he finds 
quite similar (a bit larger) negative and significant coefficient for economic 
freedom as the case of dummy variable, and makes similar interpretations. But he 
emphatically states that the sample countries still encounter regional bias in 
terms of FDI which is definitely favorable for China. 
In another study Sufian Eltayeb Mohamed and Moise Sidiropoulos (2010) 
look at the determinants of FDI in 12 MENA (Middle East North African countries) 
where their find in line results with the traditional literature of economic freedom 
and FDI. To capture more variations in FDI, they include domestic, financial, 
institution, policy, and other external variables into fixed-effects model, and 
compare estimations of MENA countries with other developed ones. They proxy 
domestic factors with market size (logarithm of GDP); financial factors with 
national stock index; institutional factors with investment profile and corruption 
levels; policy factors with inflation rate and government spending; and external 
factors with global liquidity and trade freedom. As a result they find out that the 
FDI is largely determined by the market size and trade freedom which generate 
coefficient of 98.15 and 12.43, alongside with minor determinants such as 
investment profile, corruption level, inflation rates, government spending, natural 
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resources, and growth expectation. Unlike to these results, in case of MENA 
countries the trade freedom turns out insignificant. Indeed it might be due to 
political instabilities and conflicts in this region. Latterly, Bounoua Chaib and 
Matallah Siham (2014) also address to the same issues by referring importance of 
institutional quality and political stability in order to attract FDI in Algeria. 
Lastly, all discussed literature studies are briefly summarized in the table 1. 
Table 1. Summary of Empirical Studies 
Reference Origin Sample Period Model Result 
Sambharya & 
Rasheed 
(2015) 
Global 
95 
Countries 
1995-
2000 
Panel 
Data 
Government participation and corrupt 
level has negative impact on FDI, where 
secure property rights has positive. 
Pearson et al. 
(2012) 
US 50 States 
1984-
2007 
Panel 
Data 
-Growth and economic freedom has 
positive impact on FDI. 
-Per capita income and unemployment 
rate have negative impact on FDI. 
Bengoa & 
Sanchez-
Robles (2003) 
Latin 
America 
18 
Countries 
1970-
1999 
Panel 
Data 
Economic freedom and growth generate 
FDI inflows only if a country has sufficient 
human capital accompanied by economic 
stability and liberalized markets. 
Asiedu (2006) Africa 
22 
Countries 
1984-
2000 
Panel 
Data 
-Economic growth does not always 
increases FDI. 
-A unit change in economic freedom alters 
FDI by 0.20 units when policy variable is 
proxied with human capital, and by 0.23 
units when it is proxied with 
infrastructure investments. 
Fofana (2014) 
EU, Sub-
Saharan 
25 West 
EU, 26 
Sub-
Saharan 
Countries 
2001-
2009 
Panel 
Data 
-Legal system and rule of law is significant 
determinant of FDI in Sub-Saharan states. 
-GDP has positive, and Natural Resources 
have negative impact on FDI in both West 
EU and Sub-Saharan states. 
Quazi (2007) 
East 
Asia 
7 
Countries 
1995-
2000 
Panel 
Data 
-Including China into the sample makes 
impact of economic freedom on FDI 
insignificant. 
-After controlling China with dummy 
variable, the impact turns to be 
significantly positive. 
Mohamed & 
Sidiropoulos 
(2010) 
MENA 
12 
Countries 
1975-
2006 
Panel 
Data 
-The major determinants of global FDI are 
market size and trade freedom, whereas 
the minor determinants are investment 
profile, corruption level, inflation rates, 
government spending, and natural 
resources. 
-For MENA countries trade freedom is 
insignificant. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the data 
and methodology of this study, and the results are reported in section 4. The final 
section includes concluding remarks about our analysis and its findings. 
3. Data and Methodology 
This study examines the macroeconomic impact of economic freedom on the 
foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows over the globe. The initial sample size was 
comprised of 189 countries over the period of 1995-2016. However due to 
unavailability of macro data for 33 countries, the sample size decreased to 156 
countries. 
The freedom of economic activity of the country is proxied by Economic 
Freedom Index (EDI) which is formed by Business Freedom Index (BFI), Trade 
Freedom Index (TFI), Investment Freedom Index (IFI), and Financial Freedom 
Index (FFI). The data for these indexes are gathered from online database of 
Heritage Foundation. We also investigate magnitude of FDI and EFI interaction on 
the regional basis holding the control variables such as GDP growth, Import and 
Export per GDP, Inflation, and Interest rates. The data for these variables are 
derived from online database of World Bank. Unlike to prior literature our study 
pursues the analysis with larger sample where often neglected nations such as 
fragile and conflict-affected states, sub-Saharan areas, and Oceania countries are 
also captured. Meantime with panel data analysis, we explore both fixed- and 
random-effects approaches, as well as a pooled regression of EFI on FDI. 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Data 
 
Mean Median Max. Min. 
Std. 
Dev. 
Skewness Kurtosis N 
FDI 0.8667 1.0486 6.0653 -4.6052 1.3310 -0.8586 4.8197 3432 
Growth 1.1263 1.4110 5.0104 -4.6052 1.1258 -1.3923 5.5584 3432 
Import 3.7035 3.6951 6.0517 2.1247 0.5064 0.2413 3.8322 3432 
Export 3.5624 3.5907 5.4393 0.0000 0.5948 -0.1278 3.7964 3432 
Inflation 1.5231 1.6448 7.8748 -4.6052 1.3996 -0.3511 4.5987 3432 
Interest 1.6828 1.6956 5.3151 -4.6052 1.0732 -1.3060 9.6637 3432 
EFI 4.0463 4.0792 4.5054 2.3026 0.2407 -1.8282 9.6284 3432 
Notes: The log linearization technique is applied to data. 
Following Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles (2003) approach, we extend their 
model by including macro control variables into the model as below.  
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𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑎𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑎𝑡𝐸𝐹𝐼𝑎𝑡  +  𝛽𝑗𝑎𝑡 𝑀𝑗𝑎𝑡
6
𝑗 =2
+ 𝑒𝑎𝑡                                            (Eq. 1) 
where FDI is foreign direct investment inflows of country “a” as percentage of its 
GDP at time “t”; c is a intercept; and M stands for five macro control variables of 
country “a” at time “t” respectively. Hence, “e” represents the residual term of 
the model. 
To find out the best model for our panel data, we shall look to consistency 
and efficiency of GLS estimators through cross-section fixed (FE) and random 
effects (RE). Both of these models have potential advantages –as well as 
disadvantages– in their selection. The FE model assumes heterogeneity among all 
entities by allowing to have their own intercept values. However while this 
intercept differs among entities, it does not change over the time. Therefore FE 
model generates unbiased estimates of βi, but it may suffer from high variance 
due to a larger variation between sample (country) to sample. In this case, our 
model with FE specification becomes as below. 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑎𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛼𝑖𝑎𝐷𝑖𝑎
156
𝑖=1
 + 𝛽1𝑎𝑡𝐸𝐹𝐼𝑎𝑡  +  𝛽𝑗𝑎𝑡 𝑀𝑗𝑎𝑡
6
𝑗 =2
+ 𝑒𝑎𝑡                  (Eq. 2) 
where Da is a dummy variable which equates 1 for the country “a”, and zero for 
others in the sample. We also could include a fixed effect for period by 
considering a dummy variable for years as “Dt” only in case when the period is 
different for countries in the sample.  
On the other hand, the RE model heals the high variance problem by 
generating estimates closer, on average, to the true value of any particular 
country as below. 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑎𝑡 = 𝛽0𝑎 + 𝛽1𝑎𝑡𝐸𝐹𝐼𝑎𝑡 +  𝛽𝑗𝑎𝑡 𝑀𝑗𝑎𝑡
6
𝑗 =2
+ 𝜀𝑎𝑡                                           (Eq. 3) 
𝛽0𝑎 = 𝛽0 + 𝜔𝑎   where   ωa ~ N(0, ς
2)  
When the β0a is plugged into first equation model, it becomes as below. 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑎𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑎𝑡𝐸𝐹𝐼𝑎𝑡 +  𝛽𝑗𝑎𝑡 𝑀𝑗𝑎𝑡
6
𝑗 =2
+ 𝜔𝑎 + 𝑒𝑎𝑡                                   (Eq. 4) 
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𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑎𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑎𝑡𝐸𝐹𝐼𝑎𝑡 +  𝛽𝑗𝑎𝑡 𝑀𝑗𝑎𝑡
6
𝑗 =2
+ 𝑢𝑎𝑡                                             (Eq. 5)  
where   𝑢𝑎𝑡 = 𝜔𝑎 + 𝑒𝑎𝑡 . However, due to potential correlation between 
covariates of explanatory variables and ωa the (β1-7) estimates of RE model are 
often biased. Unlike FE model, it captures both “within” and “between” 
deviations, and allows all entities to have a common mean value for intercept. 
With other words, the dummy variable “Da” -was a part of intercept in the FE- 
becomes a part of error “ea” in the RE model.  
A prior to researcher’s preference in trade-off between bias and variance, it 
is more logic to exhibit the dataset and characteristics of the sample. Besides 
there are few statistical tests that might be a guideline (table 3) in selection an 
appropriate model. According to this, initially two tests are employed: the 
Redundant Fixed Effects (RFE) and Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (BP LM) 
tests to find out whether our panel data contain respectively a fixed effect and a 
random effect. In special case when both fixed and random effects are observed 
the Hausman test is recommended which is modeled as below. 
𝐻 = (𝛽1 − 𝛽0)
′ 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝛽1) − 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝛽0) 
𝜌(𝛽1 − 𝛽0)                                        (Eq. 6) 
where 𝜌 is pseudoinverse. The H0 specifies that both β0 (FE estimator) and β1 (RE 
estimator) are consistent, but β1 is efficient while β0 is not. The alternative 
hypothesis indicates that only β0 is consistent, and β1 is not. However Andrew Bell 
and Kelvyn Jones (2015) criticize this analysis by stating that it is not a test of FE 
versus RE, but it is a test of the similarity of within and between effects. They 
assert that a RE model which accurately specifies the within and between effects 
will produce identical results to FE, regardless of the result of a Hausman test. 
They question the validity of FE model by accusing it as “between effects, other 
higher-level variables and higher level residuals, none of which can be estimated 
with FE, should not be dismissed lightly; they are often enlightening, especially for 
meaningful entities such as countries. For these reasons, ..., RE models are the 
obvious choice”. 
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Table 3. Fixed- and Random-Effects Model Selection 
Redundant Fixed 
Effect Test 
Breusch-Pagan & 
Honda LM Tests 
Concluded Model 
H0 is not rejected 
(No fixed effect) 
H0 is not rejected 
(No random effect) 
Data are poolable (Pooled OLS) 
H0 is rejected 
(Fixed effect) 
H0 is not rejected 
(No random effect) 
Fixed Effect Model (LSDV or GLS) 
H0 is not rejected 
(No fixed effect) 
H0 is rejected 
(Random effect) 
Random Effect Model (GLS) 
H0 is rejected 
(Fixed effect) 
H0 is rejected 
(Random effect) 
(1) Both Fixed & Random Effect Models 
(2) Hausman Test (recommended) 
Notes: The null hypothesis for both Breush-Pagan and Honda LM tests is "No Random Effects". The 
null hypothesis for Redundant Fixed Effect test is "No Unobserved Heterogeneity (No Fixed Effect)".  
In addition to those theoretical considerations, many researchers (Satkartar 
Kinney and David Dunson, 2007; Hun Myoung Park, 2009; Howard Bondell, Arun 
Krishna, and Sujit Gosh, 2011; Tom Clark and Drew Linzer, 2014; Bell and Jones, 
2015) suggest to account practical and technical grounds in decision stage. They 
recommend evaluating the sample characteristics and objectives in trade-off 
between fixed and random-effects model selection. They argue that fixed-effects 
model makes sense under these 2 conditions. The first, if all entities (groups) in 
the sample are functionally identical. Second, if the goal is to assess common 
effect magnitude only for sampled entities, but not to generalize it to other 
entities. 
On this basis, we assume that the model which would represent our panel 
data is more likely to be RE, as countries (entities) in the sample are not 
functionally identical, and this empirical study aims to generalize the findings to 
other entities. Moreover RE is more attractive in the panel analysis of a sample 
with large number of entities but short time periods. 
4. Analysis 
Lest a unit root problem, we shall check for stationarity of our input 
variables. For this study we have chosen the Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS), which is 
based on the well-known Dickey-Fuller procedure.  
Im, Pesaran and Shin denoted IPS proposed a test for the presence of unit 
roots in panels that combines information from the time series dimension with 
that from the cross section dimension, such that fewer time observations are 
required for the test to have power. Since the IPS test has been found to have 
superior test power by researchers in economics to analyze long-run relationships 
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in panel data, we will also employ this procedure in this study. IPS begins by 
specifying a separate ADF regression for each cross-section with individual effects 
and no time trend: 
𝛥𝑍𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜌𝑖𝑍𝑖 ,𝑡−1 +  𝛽𝑖𝛥𝑍𝑡−𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1
+ 𝑒𝑡                                                         (𝐸𝑞. 7) 
where ΔZt is the first difference of variable; α is intercept; ΔZt-i is lag differences up 
to lag length “k” where k is determined with Schwarz Infomation Criterion (SIC); et 
is White Noise residual term. The IPS hypothesizes the ρ whether it is zero or 
smaller than zero using separate unit root tests for the N cross-section units. Their 
test is based on the Augmented Dickey-fuller (ADF) statistics averaged across 
groups. After estimating the separate ADF regressions, the average of the t-
statistics for ρi from the individual ADF regressions, tiTi(ρi):  
𝑡?̅?𝑇 =
1
𝑁
 𝑡𝑖𝑇(𝜌𝑖𝛽𝑖)
𝑁
𝑖=1
                                                                                         (𝐸𝑞. 8) 
The t-bar is then standardized and it is shown that the standardized t-bar 
statistic converges to the standard normal distribution as N and T → ∞. Im, 
Pesaran, and Shin (2003) showed that t-bar test has better performance when N 
and T are small. They proposed a cross-sectionally demeaned version of both test 
to be used in the case where the errors in different regressions contain a common 
time-specific component. 
The table 4 below presents output of IPS analysis, where all variables appear 
stationary at level. Equally, the Durbin-Watson values imply that there is no any 
autocorrelation problem as they are close to 2. 
Table 4. Output of ADF Analysis 
Variables ADF p-value 
FDI -16.5742*** 0.0000 
Growth -23.8584*** 0.0000 
Imports   -3.9601*** 0.0000 
Exports   -3.5712*** 0.0002 
Inflation Rate -24.7036*** 0.0000 
Interest Rate   -3.6988*** 0.0001 
EFI -18.0212*** 0.0000 
Notes: The lag in the table is obtained with Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) without restricting 
maximum lag length. The p-values are computed assuming asymptotic normality, and  *, **,  and 
*** indicates significance at levels 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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4.1. Selection of an Appropriate Model 
The table 5 presents the results of RFE, BP LM, and Hausman tests which are 
applied to specify an appropriate model for our panel data. In EFI model, where 
dependent variable FDI is regressed with independent control variables and EFI, 
RFE test rejects the null hypothesis which makes the pooled model inappropriate, 
but the FE model. On the other hand, the BP LM test indicates that the RE model 
is also appropriate. Indeed, this is a special case where either FE and RE models 
can be used, or the Hausman test can be utilized to choice one of these two 
models.  
Table 5. Model Selection 
Redundant Fixed 
Effect Test 
Breusch-Pagan 
LM Test 
Hausman 
Test 
Decision 
15.8400 
(0.0000) 
2090.984 
(0.0000) 
22.4197 
(0.0010) 
FE model is appropriate. 
Notes:  In EFI Model the dependent FDI is regressed with control variables (growth, import, export, 
trade, inflation, and interest rate) and Economic Freedom Index. The null hypothesis of Redundant 
Fixed Effect Test is no unobserved heterogeneity (no fixed effect) in the model, so pooled model 
should be used. The null hypothesis for Breusch-Pagan LM Test is no random effect in the model. 
The null hypothesis for Hausman Test is that there is no correlation between unique errors and the 
regressors. It implies that both FE and RE estimates are unbiased, but RE is more efficient than FE. 
So, if null fails to be rejected then RE model would be appropriate. The Redundant Fixed Effect and 
Breusch-Pagan LM tests show T statistics, whereas the Hausman tests shows Chi-square statistics 
alongside with probability values in parentheses.  
In the decision-making stage, the Hausman test reveals that estimators of RE 
model are biased. The analysis suggests the FE as an appropriate model for our 
data. Nonetheless we decide to utilize both models as our sample characteristics 
make the RE more attractive -countries (entities) in the sample are not 
functionally identical; purpose of the study is generalizing the findings to other 
entities too; and large number of entities (156) alongside with short time period 
(19)- than the FE. 
4.2. Main Results 
The table 6 presents the main results of this study, where findings reveal that 
EFI has positive and significant impact on FDI under both FE and RE models. The 
magnitude of this impact considerably changes between two FE models which are 
estimated with GLS and LSDV methods. 
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Table 6. Results of Panel OLS Models 
 FE (GLS) FE (LSDV) RE Pooled 
C 
-8.2133*** 
(0.5070) 
-9.6664*** 
(0.6941) 
-8.884*** 
(0.5960) 
-8.0044*** 
(0.4452) 
Growth 
0.0574*** 
(0.0122) 
0.0786*** 
(0.0177) 
0.0907*** 
(0.0175) 
0.1404*** 
(0.0191) 
Import 
-1.2719*** 
(0.0829) 
-1.3351*** 
(0.1105) 
-1.1306*** 
(0.0920) 
-0.8171*** 
(0.0632) 
Export 
0.3857*** 
(0.1207) 
0.2231** 
(0.0928) 
0.2393*** 
(0.0787) 
0.2807*** 
(0.0556) 
Inflation Rate 
-0.0323** 
(0.0115) 
-0.0316** 
(0.0165) 
-0.0330** 
(0.0162) 
-0.0421*** 
(0.0171) 
Interest Rate 
0.0470** 
(0.0184) 
0.0395 
(0.0298) 
0.0229 
(0.0163) 
0.0244 
(0.0171) 
EFI 
1.1535*** 
(0.1096) 
1.2653*** 
(0.1436) 
1.2227*** 
(0.1291) 
1.1323*** 
(0.0997) 
Weighted R2 0.6192 - 0.1350 - 
Unweighted R2 0.4934 0.4955 0.2299 0.2413 
Total Obs. 3432 3432 3432 3432 
σu - - 0.2929 - 
σe - - 0.7071 - 
Notes: The Panel OLS estimation methodology is used to determine FDI with 156 cross-sections and 
22 periods (1995-2016). The FE (GLS - Generalized Least Squares) model has fixed effect of cross-
section and GLS cross-section weights; FE (LSDV - Least Squares with Dummy Variables) model has 
fixed effect of cross-section without any GLS weights; RE model has random effect of cross-section; 
and Pooled model is free of any effect specifications and GLS weights. The White standard errors are 
presented in parentheses, and *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels 
respectively. The ςu and ςe represent Swamy and Arora estimator of variance components of 
random effect (cross-section and idiosyncratic respectively) with rho numbers. 
More specifically, the R2 of FE (GLS) model implies that 62% of variation in 
FDI is accounted by EFI and control variables. Meantime all variables appear 
statistically significant between at 1%-5% levels. The coefficients of GDP growth, 
Export, Interest, and EFI respectively as 0.0574, 0.3857, 0.0470, and 1.1535 reveal 
that these variables have positive impact on FDI. Particularly, the role of control 
variables is blatant. The greatest impact on FDI appears as Imports, Exports, and 
EFI. A unit increase in imports shrinks FDI by 1.27 units, whereas a unit increase in 
exports and EFI augments FDI by 0.38 units and 1.15 units respectively. The roles 
of inflation and interest rates also make sense as a unit increase of inflation 
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diminishes FDI by 0.03 and a unit increase in interest enhances FDI by 0.05 units 
respectively.  
In the FE (LSDV) model R2 drops to 50 % and the coefficient of EFI increases 
to 1.26 preserving its significance at 1% level. Equally, all variables except interest 
preserve their significances while coefficients of export and interest decrease, and 
coefficients of growth and imports increase. The coefficient of inflations appears 
approximately same as in FE (GLS) case. Similar scenario repeats in RE and Pooled 
models as well. However, the R2 values in the RE and pooled models have got 
even worse as they drop to 23% and 24 % respectively. The estimates of EFI in RE 
and Pooled models indicate that a unit increase in EFI augments FDI by 1.22 units 
and 1.13 units respectively. Similar to FE (LSDV) case, both in RE and Pooled 
models interest rates appear to be statistically insignificant. 
To conclude, we rely on estimates of Fixed models as model selection tests in 
table 5 points out that RE model is biased, so FE is appropriate. Therefore, results 
of both FE models GLS and LSDV are valid, however the GLS performs better as it 
accounts much greater variations of FDI. 
4.3. Regional Results 
The table 7 presents regional results of our panel study analysis where 
pooled, FE, and RE models are used on the basis of aftermath of model selection 
test such as RFE, BP LM, and Hausman. In case of European (EU) sample, FE model 
appears more appropriate where 54.17% of variation in FDI is accounted by 
control variables and EFI. According to estimated results, EFI gets coefficient of 
2.40 which is significant at 1% level. It indicates that a unit increase in EFI 
augments FDI by almost two and half folds. Indeed this is the highest magnitude 
of EFI among all studied regions. Meantime, GDP growth, export, and interest rate 
variables also get positive estimates which are significant at 1% level. A unit 
increase in these three variables augments FDI by 0.06 units, 1.06 units, and 0.27 
units respectively. The positive relationships between growth-FDI and interest 
rates-FDI make sense from foreign investors' perspective as they rely on growing 
economy and love high interest returns.  
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Table 7. Results of Regional Panel OLS Analysis 
 EU AS AF NA LA OC FC SS PS 
C 
-9.9702*** 
(1.2478) 
-3.5245*** 
(0.9695) 
-8.7198*** 
(1.2369) 
-10.0040*** 
(2.8418) 
-3.4354*** 
(1.0384) 
-4.6717** 
(2.2399) 
-7.2338*** 
(1.6575) 
-8.2462*** 
(1.2205) 
-4.5898*** 
(1.4618) 
Growth 
0.0612*** 
(0.0216) 
0.0341*** 
(0.0029) 
0.1035*** 
(0.0303) 
0.0445*** 
(0.0074) 
0.0474*** 
(0.0056) 
0.2057*** 
(0.0545) 
0.2200*** 
(0.0480) 
0.1432*** 
(0.0331) 
0.0800*** 
(0.0310) 
Import 
-1.3954*** 
(0.2539) 
-0.8771*** 
(0.1424) 
-1.5795*** 
(0.1466) 
-1.4940*** 
(0.2981) 
0.4727 
(0.3899) 
-0.6969*** 
(0.2971) 
-0.6319*** 
(0.2281) 
-1.2972*** 
(0.1399) 
-0.8827*** 
(0.2052) 
Export 
1.0613*** 
(0.2061) 
0.5581*** 
(0.1624) 
0.2779** 
(0.1309) 
0.1311 
(0.2342) 
0.3262*** 
(0.0819) 
0.0961 
(0.2378) 
0.5733*** 
(0.1378) 
0.2792** 
(0.1338) 
0.2473 
(0.1674) 
Inflation Rate 
-0.0782*** 
(0.0256) 
-0.0881*** 
(0.0337) 
0.0235 
(0.0222) 
-0.0531** 
(0.0264) 
-0.2219** 
(0.1027) 
-0.2894*** 
(0.0299) 
0.0145 
(0.0442) 
-0.2321*** 
(0.0334) 
-0.0203 
(0.0416) 
Interest Rate 
0.2752*** 
(0.0378) 
0.2220*** 
(0.0266) 
0.1654*** 
(0.0417) 
0.2855** 
(0.1389) 
0.1889 
(0.1604) 
-0.0186 
(0.0811) 
0.0649 
(0.0620) 
-0.0232 
(0.0729) 
0.0614** 
(0.0201) 
EFI 
2.4039*** 
(0.2429) 
1.3934*** 
(0.2275) 
1.2105*** 
(0.2976) 
1.9090*** 
(0.6369) 
1.3933*** 
(0.3322) 
0.7878** 
(0.3510) 
0.7029** 
(0.3470) 
0.7776*** 
(0.2914) 
0.9873*** 
(0.2940) 
Weighted R2 0.5417 0.7905 0.5298 0.2868 0.6677 0.2228 0.1508 0.5712 0.1508 
Unweighted R2 0.5129 0.5969 0.4474 0.3580 0.5327 0.3213 0.2114 0.4899 0.0642 
Cross-section 42 26 45 12 15 15 23 40 15 
Total Obs 924 572 990 264 330 330 506 880 330 
σu - - - 0.2881 - 0.1414 0.1318 - 0.3984 
σe - - - 0.7119 - 0.8586 0.8682 - 0.6016 
RFE  
5.8565 
(0.0000) 
17.9109 
(0.0000) 
12.9808 
(0.0000) 
13.7719 
(0.0000) 
25.1884 
(0.0000) 
12.5855 
(0.0000) 
10.6883 
(0.0000) 
12.4504 
(0.0000) 
17.8125 
(0.0000) 
BP LM 
172.7284 
(0.0000) 
174.9032 
(0.0000) 
308.2883 
(0.0000) 
63.7747 
(0.0000) 
126.9496 
(0.0000) 
35.0050 
(0.0000) 
51.2183 
(0.0000) 
268.7579 
(0.0000) 
319.2704 
(0.0000) 
Hausman 
16.3472 
(0.0120) 
19.7777 
(0.0030) 
22.8379 
(0.0009) 
8.4933 
(0.1076) 
59.8990 
(0.0000) 
12.1062 
(0.0596) 
7.2847 
(0.2953) 
20.8435 
(0.0020) 
10.9184 
(0.0909) 
Decision FE FE FE RE FE RE RE FE RE 
Notes: The Panel OLS estimation methodology is used to determine FDI in Europe (EU), Asia (AS), North Africa 
(AF), North America (NA), Latin America (LA), Oceania (OC), Fragile-Conflict States (FC), Sub-Saharan (SS), and 
Post-Soviet (PS) countries with EFI and control variables over 22 periods (1995-2016). Each sample is estimated 
on its appropriate decided model where FE and RE has cross-section fixed and random effects respectively, 
whereas pooled model is free of any effect specifications. The null hypotheses of Redundant Fixed Effect (RFE),  
Breusch-Pagan (BP) LM , and Hausman tests are presented in table 5. The Redundant Fixed Effect and Breusch-
Pagan LM tests show T statistics, whereas the Hausman tests shows Chi-square statistics alongside with 
probability values in parentheses. The White standard errors are presented in parentheses, and *, **, and *** 
denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. The ςu and ςe represent Swamy and Arora estimator 
of variance components of random effect (cross-section and idiosyncratic respectively) with rho numbers. 
On the other hand, import and inflation rate variables get negative 
coefficients which imply inverse relationship to FDI. A unit increase in these 
variables shrinks FDI by 1.39 units and 0.08 units respectively. The negative 
impact of inflation rates on FDI makes sense as foreign investors avoid inflationary 
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markets rather prefer price level to be stable in long-term in order to initiating or 
continuing their investment activities in that country. 
For Asian (AS) sample, the model selection tests again suggest FE model as 
the most appropriate one where 79% of FDI is explained by input variables. The 
results of this model appear similar to European case. Here, EFI generates a 
coefficient of 1.39 at 1% significance level indicating that a unit increase in EFI 
enhances FDI by 1.39 units. This impact was twofold in European case. This might 
be due to high levels of democracy (in terms of protection of investors' rights) and 
well-established financial markets in European markets comparing to Asian 
markets. Besides, the positive coefficients of Growth, Export, and Interest rate 
that a unit increase in these variables scales FDI by 0.03 units, 0.56 units, and 0.22 
units respectively.  
We consider two different samples for African countries: North African (AF) 
and Sub-Saharan (SS). Because these two regions have significant differences in 
market characteristics. For AF sample, the model selection test points FE as 
appropriate model which account nearly 53% of variations in FDI. The results 
estimate positive impacts running from GDP growth, Exports, Interest rates, and 
EFI to FDI, whereas imports generate a negative impact. Here, a unit increase in 
GDP growth, Exports, Interest Rates augments FDI by 0.10 units, 0.28 units, and 
0.16 units respectively. FDI is highly sensitive to the trade activities in African 
regions; therefore the model derives a significant coefficient for exports (0.28) 
and imports (-1.58).  The inflation rates get a positive estimate, however, it fails to 
be statistically significant. Additionally, notice that interest rates derive positive 
and statistically significant, however, its magnitude is smaller than EU and AS 
ones. This indicates that interest rates have limited impact on attracting foreign 
investors. The same scenario presents in EFI factor. It takes a coefficient of 1.21 
which is significant at 1% level, but its magnitude is smaller than EU and AS. One 
can argue that international investors are less sensitive to activates of weakly-
established financial markets, thus, this might be a key reason behind these 
results. 
Interestingly, the model selection tests suggest RE as the most appropriate 
model for North American (NA) sample and FE model for Latin American (LA) 
sample. Although all series except exports appear to be statistically significant in 
NA, RE model accounts only 36% variation in FDI. Similar to EU and AS cases, RE 
model estimates positive coefficient for GDP growth, exports, interest rates, and 
EFI, whereas the model estimates negative coefficient for imports and inflation 
rates. On the other hand, FE model accounts 66% of variation in FDI by generating 
statistically significant coefficient for GDP growth, Exports, Inflation rates, and EFI. 
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Notice that magnitude of GDP growth variable in both NA and LA is almost equal, 
around 0.04. However, there are remarkable differences in magnitudes and in 
significance levels of other explanatory variables of NA and LA. For instance, 
reaction of FDI to inflation rates is more aggressive in case of LA where a unit 
increase in inflation decreases FDI by 0.22 units. It might be due proneness of 
inflation of LA region which likely to deter foreign investments. More importantly, 
the EFI coefficient implies that economic freedom has a greater value in NA region 
in terms of attracting FDI comparing to LA one. Once again it shed light on 
structural differences between financial markets of these two regions. 
Unquestionably the most interesting parts of this study are the cases of 
Oceanian (OC), Fragile-Conflict (FC), Sub-Saharan (SS), and Post-Soviet (PS) states. 
To our knowledge these regions are either never or rarely analyzed. Therefore 
with this study we fill this room. The aftermath of analysis shows that in cases of 
OC, FC, and PS, the RE model appears as the most appropriate and it accounts 
around 32%, 21%, and 6% of variation in FDI respectively. In case of SS, model 
selection test suggest FE model which accounts 57% of variation in FDI. Moreover, 
in all these cases the EFI generates positive and significant coefficients. This 
significance is relatively lesser in cases of OC and FC than others. More 
interestingly, coefficients of EFI get value of 0.70, 0.77, 0.79, and 0.99 in FC, SS, 
OC, and PS respectively. Notice that these values are the weakest (the lowest) 
ones among other samples' EFI coefficients. The weakest EFI appears in FC region 
which is followed by SS. This implies that the impact of EFI on FDI is lesser 
comparing to others regions, but it is still significant factor in determination of 
FDI.  
The control variables of GDP growth, Imports, and exports also contribute 
significance to these models. Especially, imports and GDP growth appear as 
locomotives of FDI as they generates significant coefficients of -0.70 and 0.20 in 
OC, -0.63 and 0.22 in FC, -1.29 and 0.14 in SS, and -0.88 and 0.08 in PS. As well as, 
the role of inflation rates in OC and SS is also remarkable. It implies that a unit 
increase in inflation rates shrink in FDI by 0.29 units in OC, and 0.23 units in SS 
zone.  
5. Conclusion 
The study investigates the impact of economic freedom on FDI inflows 
globally taking into account often neglected regions such as Sub-Saharan, Post-
Soviet, and Conflict-Affected countries in a panel data. The global analysis shows 
that FDI is largely affected by internal-external trades and economic freedom of 
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the countries in FE model. Although RE model generates quite similar results, 
Hausman test implies that they are biased. 
On the regional basis, the study perfectly demonstrates remarkable impact of 
EFI on FDI as in all cases it generates positive estimates at 1% significance level, 
except OC and FC samples where the significance is limited with 5% level. More 
interestingly the sensitivity of FDI on EFI is relatively less in OC, FC, and SS states, 
and high in EU, NA, and AS regions. The analysis derives significant coefficients for 
economic freedom variable, but indifferent in magnitudes. In European sample 
EFI obtains the largest magnitude with FE model where a unit increase in EFI 
augments FDI by 2.40 units. European sample is followed by North American 
sample with EFI value of 1.90; Asian and Latin American sample with EFI values of 
1.39; North African sample with EFI value of 1.21; Post-Soviet sample with 0.99; 
Ocenian and Sub-Saharan samples with EFI value of 0.78; and Fragile-Conflict 
affected states sample with lowest EFI value of 0.70. 
As a result, it suggest to pursue EFI-oriented policy and to implement new 
plans to attract more and more FDI which will bring in new innovative and 
automation based technologies that can rejuvenate the host country’s existing 
manufacturing base.  Furthermore, human labour transfer in the form of highly 
skilled, experienced and knowledge-versed is a remarkable move to boost the 
country’s economic growth. As a twin opportunity, the results also suggest to 
implement a trade regime that encourage domestic manufacturer by various of 
policies including weakening in value of national monetary unit (exchange rates) 
in order to create an export-oriented industries in the economy. But while 
implementing all these policies, the economy should first of all maintain secure 
and stable financial grounds with high standards of liberal economic regulations. 
The control variables of GDP growth, Imports, and exports also plays 
significant role in determination of FDI. This is more blatant in well-established 
(developed) financial markets such as EU, AS, and NA countries; whereas 
significance of control variables remain very limited in weakly-established or 
restricted financial markets such as OC, FC, SS, and PS countries. It might be 
motivated by high levels of political and financial uncertainty in these regions. To 
make it clear, we suggest further researchers to consider impacts of other factors 
such as political instability, corruption level, institutional rights, financial and labor 
market regulations, and credit default risks. 
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Appendix 
Table 8. Sampled Countries 
SAMPLED COUNTRIES SAMPLED COUNTRIES 
1 Albania 79 Latvia 
2 Algeria 80 Lebanon 
3 Angola 81 Lesotho 
4 Argentina 82 Libya 
5 Armenia 83 Lithuania 
6 Australia 84 Luxembourg 
7 Austria 85 Macedonia 
8 Azerbaijan 86 Madagascar 
9 Bahrain 87 Malawi 
10 Bangladesh 88 Malaysia 
11 Barbados 89 Mali 
12 Belarus 90 Malta 
13 Belgium 91 Mauritania 
14 Belize 92 Mauritius 
15 Benin 93 Mexico 
16 Bolivia 94 Moldova 
17 Bosnia and Herzegovina 95 Mongolia 
18 Botswana 96 Morocco 
19 Brazil 97 Mozambique 
20 Bulgaria 98 Namibia 
21 Burkina Faso 99 Nepal 
22 Burundi 100 New Zealand 
23 Cabo Verde 101 Nicaragua 
24 Cambodia 102 Niger 
25 Cameroon 103 Nigeria 
26 Canada 104 Norway 
27 Central African Republic 105 Oman 
28 Chad 106 Pakistan 
29 Chile 107 Panama 
30 China 108 Papua New Guinea 
31 Colombia 109 Paraguay 
32 Costa Rica 110 Peru 
33 Cote d'Ivoire 111 Philippines 
34 Croatia 112 Poland 
35 Cuba 113 Portugal 
36 Cyprus 114 Qatar 
37 Czech Republic 115 Republic of Congo 
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38 Democratic Republic of Congo 116 Romania 
39 Denmark 117 Russian 
40 Djibouti 118 Rwanda 
41 Dominican Republic 119 Saudi Arabia 
42 Ecuador 120 Senegal 
43 Egypt 121 Sierra Leone 
44 El Salvador 122 Singapore 
45 Equatorial Guinea 123 Slovakia 
46 Estonia 124 Slovenia 
47 Ethiopia 125 South Africa 
48 Fiji 126 South Korea 
49 Finland 127 Spain 
50 France 128 Sri Lanka 
51 Gabon 129 Suriname 
52 Georgia 130 Swaziland 
53 Germany 131 Sweden 
54 Ghana 132 Switzerland 
55 Greece 133 Syria 
56 Guatemala 134 Tajikistan 
57 Guinea 135 Tanzania 
58 Guinea-Bissau 136 Thailand 
59 Guyana 137 The Bahamas 
60 Haiti 138 The Gambia 
61 Honduras 139 The Netherlands 
62 Hong Kong 140 Togo 
63 Hungary 141 Trinidad and Tobago 
64 Iceland 142 Tunisia 
65 India 143 Turkey 
66 Indonesia 144 Turkmenistan 
67 Iran 145 Uganda 
68 Ireland 146 Ukraine 
69 Israel 147 United Arab Emirates 
70 Italy 148 United Kingdom 
71 Jamaica 149 United States 
72 Japan 150 Uruguay 
73 Jordan 151 Uzbekistan 
74 Kazakhstan 152 Venezuela 
75 Kenya 153 Vietnam 
76 Kuwait 154 Yemen 
77 Kyrgyz Republic 155 Zambia 
78 LAOS 156 Zimbabwe 
